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1 It is common knowledge that specialised languages use lexico-grammatical features of
natural languages to express the communicative objectives of specialised communities.
Compiling and analysing specialised corpora is one way of identifying recurrent features
that tend to shed light on these special uses. As a result, it is possible to draw up a list of
the linguistic characteristics specific to a specialised language, such as the use of a special
lexicon or special grammatical features. These features are “special” only in that they
reflect how a specialised language under-uses or overuses certain lexical and grammatical
features of a given language (Sourioux & Lerat [1975: 44], Lerat [1995: 40]). For instance,
as shown elsewhere (Richard [2006: 138] & [2008: 13-14]), the law needs to be generic due
to its  normative  character1,  one effect  of  which is  that  it  entails  a  large  number  of
impersonal  utterances  in  legal  language,  notably  a  wide  use  –  and  possibly  over-
developed use when compared to general English – of the passive voice. Some of these
features are so specific compared to other varieties of languages, whether specialised or
not,  that  they  will  naturally  be  identified  as  typical  of,  say,  legal  English,  economic
English and so on.  Therefore,  lexis  –  and,  to some extent,  grammar – appears to be
distinct from one specialised language to another, or from non-specialised languages to
specialised languages, which would tend to show that specialised lexicons, together with
some grammatical features, are a defining feature of specialised languages. 
2 Yet, as we will show, much of legal lexis is shared by other types of language, in particular
everyday,  non-specialised  language,  which  implies  that  legal  lexis  is  necessarily
polysemous.  Therefore  the  question  is:  how  legal/specialised  is  legal  lexis?  Or,  put
differently: what makes legal lexis legal? Can legal lexis be considered a characteristic of
legal language? Such questions require us to define the communicative needs of the legal
domain on the one hand, and legal lexis on the other, including those units which are
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borrowed,  for  the most  part,  from general  English.  What  part  of  legal  lexis  do they
represent and to what extent can they be considered as “specialised”?
3 Before going any further, we need to look at three fundamental elements regarding legal
language and legal lexis. The first one has to do with the very definition of legal lexis. A
narrow definition includes all the lexical units bearing at least one legal meaning (Cornu
[2005: 14]), which means that these elements are likely to feature in legal dictionaries, the
aim of  which is  “to  register  the language” as  Johnson wrote  when he published his
Dictionary of the English Language in 1755. This narrow definition also implies that some
units also have non-legal meaning(s). In a broader definition, on the other hand, legal
lexis  comprises  all  the  lexical  units  used by law to  achieve  its  communicative  ends,
whether  these  ends  regard  intra-professional  communication  between  legal  experts
(lawyers, judges etc.), or inter-professional communication between legal experts and lay
people (Isani [2011: §16]). This broader definition implies that certain legal units do not
have any specific legal meaning outside of a legal context, and that others have no legal
meaning at all and will require specific legal rules of interpretation to be understood in a
particular legal context. As a matter of fact, and this is the second element that must be
borne in mind, there are no hermetic lexical – nor any grammatical – borders between
legal  language  and  non-legal  language.  As  we  will  show,  the  law  has  borrowed
innumerable lexical units from other types of languages and domains, in particular the
general and religious ones, and in doing so has attributed to them one or more legal
meaning(s). The third element we need to take into account and which ensues from the
first two, is that legal lexical units rarely have any exclusively legal meaning. Polysemy,
consequently, is unquestionably one of the major characteristics of legal lexis in English.
In this context, we need to distinguish between internal polysemy (one unit has several
meanings in law) and external polysemy (one unit has at least one legal meaning and one
non-legal meaning). Besides, these two types of polysemy may coexist, since a lexeme
borrowed from general English may have different legal meanings, as is the case with, for
example, the verb “apprehend”, or the noun “assessment” which may be interpreted in
four different ways depending on the branch of the law it is used in.
4 In view of these considerations, this article will first focus on some of the borrowings that
characterise legal lexis in English and then look at some of the interpretation difficulties
posed  by  a  number  of  lexical  units  that  do  not  stand  out  as  being  “legal”  but  yet
consistently  appear  in  legal  messages  and  are  recorded,  for  some  of  them,  in  legal
dictionaries.
 
1. Legal Lexical Borrowings
5 A loanword (or lexical borrowing) may be defined as “a word that at some point in the
history of a language entered its lexicon as a result of borrowing (or transfer, or copying)”
(Haspelmath [2009: 36]). In most definitions, the term “lexical borrowing” describes both
the diachronic process through which lexical units are copied into the recipient language
and the borrowed units themselves. Unsurprisingly, lexical borrowings are closely linked
to the history of English law and legal English, and as such form a major characteristic of
legal lexis.
6 Four major types of loanwords may be identified. The first consists in copying words from
a foreign language into legal English. The donor/source languages are mainly old Norse (a
language  spoken  by  the  Vikings  who  settled  in  England  between  the  8th and  13 th
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centuries), Latin (especially at the time of the development of Christianity in England
since 596,  with a loanword peak in the 10th century)  and Norman French which has
undoubtedly  left  the  largest  number  of traces  in  legal  English as  we know it  today.
Loanwords often undergo some morphological  and/or syntactic  changes so that  they
“will fit better into the recipient language. These changes are generally called loanword
adaptation” (Haspelmath [2009: 42]).
7 A second type of borrowing concerns lexical units coming from domains other than the
law. Two domains may be mentioned in particular. The first is the religious domain. Some
of the most emblematic examples are the lexemes “cell”, which originally meant a monk’s
cell, and “clerk”, which originally referred to the Catholic priests who were in charge of
drawing up the writs2. Besides, some of the most well-known legal conceptual metaphors
directly originate from the religious sphere, such as “act of God”, “fruit of the poisonous
tree”, “prayer for relief” or “the neighbour principle”, for instance. The second domain is
the general or non-specialised English domain. General English loanwords were inevitable
since legal English is part and parcel of the English language. These borrowings from
general English have undoubtedly enriched legal lexis but they have also given rise to
interpretation issues.
8 A third type of borrowing is that of lexical units borrowed by one Common Law system
from another. This is due to the fact that English Common Law has spread in the former
English colonies all over the world, resulting in some of its lexemes existing in other
Common Law languages, but not without potential changes in meaning3. Additionally, one
may  consider  a  fourth  type  of  borrowing  which  follows  the  opposite  direction,  i.e.
lexemes borrowed from legal English by other domains/activities. Though an interesting
line of enquiry in itself, for the purposes of this article such borrowings will not be taken
into account.
 
1.1. Foreign lexical borrowings 
9 The  reasons  behind  foreign  lexical  borrowings  are  diverse  and  not  always  easy  to
pinpoint. Most may be put down to the successive invasions that took place in England
between the 5th and the 11th centuries (namely, the Romans, the Anglo-Saxons, the Danes4
and the Normans), and to the ways in which Common Law slowly developed in England.
Some lexemes were borrowed either because they referred to legal concepts that were
unknown in the legal system at the time and considered useful (“murder”,  “outlaw”,
“bond” and “trust” all come from old Norse and Dane Law for instance) or because they
designated foreign legal concepts that were specifically applied to the foreign populations
living in Anglo-Saxon territory (mostly Danes) and which slowly found their way into
legal English5 (usually by undergoing some degree of morphological adaptation).
10 The loan process was different in the case of  Latin as many Latin words came to be
incorporated into legal English mostly because the writs were originally written in Latin
by the priests (Branaa et al [2006: 9], Lévy-Ullmann [1999: 145-146]). As a matter of fact,
many  of  the  lexemes  used  in  procedural  English  originate  from  Latin  (“counsel”,
“counsellor”,  “attorney”,  “solicitor”,  “advocate”,  “delict”,  etc.).  Some  have  been
translated  literally  (“in  witness  whereof”,  “know  all  men  by  these  presents”,  for
example), others have kept their initial Latin spelling (subpoena, affidavit, versus, amicus
curiae, corpus delicti, per se, habeas corpus, etc.)6.
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11 Yet, the language that has had the greatest influence on English legal lexis is undoubtedly
French,  as  Law  French  was  the  language  of  the  law  in  England  from  the  early
development of  the Common law under the influence of  the Normans7 until  the 18 th
century when Parliament passed laws (in 1731, 1733 and 1735) to impose English as the
only language to be used in legal practice8. As a result of use over a protracted period of
six or seven centuries, a large number of legal lexical units can be traced back to French
origins  (Pollock  &  Maitland  [1968: 80-81]).  Over  the  years,  a  majority  of  these  have
adapted to the English language. An analysis of the 8th edition of Black’s Law Dictionary
shows that the lexemes that have kept the (old) French spelling only account for 0.20% of
all the entries in this dictionary. Some examples of unaltered old French expressions still
present in legal English today are en ventre sa mere, fait accompli, cestui que trust/vie, force
majeure, oyez or voir dire.
12 Most of  the foreign borrowings discussed above are essentially of  a legal  nature and
would reinforce the hypothesis that legal lexis is indeed “special”.
 
1.2. Borrowings from non-legal domains
13 A second category of loanwords which has considerably enriched legal lexis comes from
lexemes  from  non-legal  domains.  When  the  law  borrows  lexical  units  from  other
domains, two main semantic phenomena can be distinguished: the loanwords may keep
their original meaning(s) – what I refer to as “source-oriented lexis” as it preserves the
meaning(s) of the source language – or they are attributed specific legal meaning(s) –
what I refer to as “recipient-oriented lexis”9. In both cases, the lexical units in question
may not appear to be particularly “legal” per se, and do so only when associated with a
lexeme or context which is clearly legal. This is especially obvious when the meaning of
the loanwords remains fairly close, if not identical, to the one they had in the donor/
source language (“source-oriented lexis”).  One illustration of  this phenomenon is  the
adjective “petty” (or petit)  as found in “petty crime”,  “petty larceny” or “petty jury”
under  American  law:  the  adjective  corresponds  exactly  to  what  it  means  in  general
French (“small”, “minor”), as exemplified by the definition of “petit larceny” provided by
the online version of Black’s Law Dictionary: “a term for taking another person’s property
unlawfully where the value of the property is not large”. Anyone aware of the original
meaning will have no difficulty grasping the meaning of the adjective in any noun phrase.
14 Similarly,  certain  lexical  units  borrowed  from  the  religious  domain  may  also  be
interpreted according to their initial meaning, such as “act of God” (a natural disaster
beyond  human  control),  “redemption”  (which  refers  to  some  form  of  release  as  in
“redemption of  a  debt”  or  “redemption of  mortgage”10),  “days  of  grace”  (which was
“originally a gratuitous favor, hence its name, but custom has rendered it a legal right”,
Black’s Law Dictionary [1998: 481]), or “pray”, which is defined as “to request earnestly” in
Garner’s Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage [1987: 426]11. It follows that the “source-oriented
lexis” does not carry any special legal flavour if not used in a legal context or situation.
This also holds true in the case of “recipient-oriented lexis”, that is to say when the law
has attributed specific legal meaning to the loanwords, so that when considered outside
of a specific context, these lexemes have both legal and non-legal meanings.
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1.3. Borrowings from other Common Law systems
15 A loanword may originally  come from another  Common Law system and be given a
specific meaning in the recipient legal system. As mentioned earlier, colonisation led to
the spread of English Common Law all over the world, a phenomenon encapsulated in the
tree metaphor, the trunk being the English Common Law system and the branches the
other Common Law systems subsequently created through British colonisation. One of
the salient consequences of such borrowings concerns the fact that certain legal lexemes
do not have the same meaning in American English and in British English: “to table an
amendment”, for example, means to present it in British English but to postpone it in
American English12.
 
1.4 The importance of context
16 “Recipient-oriented  lexis”  thus  typically  creates  false  friends  (i.e.  lexemes  sharing  a
similar  morphology  but  carrying  different  meanings).  “Recipient-oriented  lexis”  may
combine with foreign borrowing processes also. For instance, many lexemes coming from
non-legal French have been attributed a legal meaning which may be traceable to the
original  non-legal  word,  and  sometimes  to  the  original  meaning  while  remaining
different  from it  (such as  evidence/“obviousness”  and “evidence/proof”,  and tort and
“tort”13). In other instances, the law has kept the original meaning(s) and added some
specifically legal meaning(s) as is the case with the verb “avoid” (from the old French
esvuider through the Latin viduare i.e. “empty”) which has the same meaning as in general
English (“escape”, “evade”) but may also mean “cancel”, “make void” in contract law. The
“recipient-oriented lexis” indicates therefore that the semantic links with the original
language or domain have been severed or are too loose to be identified with the original
meaning(s).
17 Whether  loanwords  belong  to  the  “source-oriented  lexis”  or  the  “recipient-oriented
lexis”, their legal flavour is therefore entirely dependent on context. If one considers any
of the examples provided above, none would seem particularly “legal” outside of a legal
context (“avoid”, “redemption”, “grace”, “petty”, “prayer”, for example), except in two
opposing cases: the first concerns the lexemes which are also used in everyday English –
in which case they may have been borrowed by general English from legal English – and
which therefore carry a legal flavour whatever the context, as is the case of “evidence”
for instance14; or, conversely, they are used in legal English exclusively (as is the case of
“tort”, for example), which does not mean that they will not appear in general English
dictionaries. For instance, “tort” is defined as “a wrongful act other than a breach of
contract for which relief may be obtained in the form of damages or an injunction” in the
US Merriam-Webster Dictionary and as “an action that harms someone and for which you
can  be  judged  legally  responsible  although it  is  not  a  crime”15 in  the  UK MacMillan
Dictionary,  both  dictionaries  being  dedicated  to  providing  definitions  in  ordinary
language.  In  the  same way,  such non-specialised  dictionaries  also  have  an entry  for
typically legal adverbs such as “herein”, “hereinafter”, “hereunder”, “heretofore” and
the like, the majority of which were copied into legal English in the course of the 8th
century. As adverbs,  they carry no legal meaning but their almost exclusive usage in
(usually formal) legal or para-legal contexts automatically gives them a legal flavour.
Is legal lexis a characteristic of legal language?
Lexis, 11 | 2018
5
18 Apart from these two specific, opposing uses, borrowed lexemes need to be put into a
legal context to acquire their legal meaning(s), which indicates that this part of legal lexis
is “legal” only in so far as it is contextualised. Even though an exact assessment of the
proportion these lexemes represent in legal lexis would require a thorough analysis of
several legal dictionaries, it is reasonably safe to assert that quite a significant part of
legal lexis carries non-legal meanings in contexts other than the law – which leads to the
conclusion that not only is legal lexis partially polysemous, it is also not specific to the
law as a domain. A random look through a legal dictionary highlights the fact that few
lexemes actually describe legal concepts and therefore qualify as “terms”. In light of this,
Wüster’s theory [1968] that terms are unequivocal needs to be revisited since terms are
not systematically unambiguous and often require some degree of context analysis to be
interpreted properly as, for example, the terms belonging to two different Common Law
systems. It thus follows that the legal essence of legal lexis is essentially dependent on
how legal the message is. We define a legal message as a message creating legal effects, as
opposed to non-legal messages – these include “para-legal messages” – which merely talk
about the law instead of actually expressing it, such as law-related fiction, newspaper
articles and research papers on legal topics, for example16.
19 However, establishing that context is paramount in defining and interpreting legal lexis
does not necessarily mean that the meaning becomes clear. As a matter of fact, some
specific rules of interpretation are sometimes required to help define how some lexemes
should be interpreted in a given legal context. This is particularly true when loanwords




20 In order to serve its generic purpose, the law commonly borrows some lexemes from
general English which, paradoxically enough, cause complex interpretation issues. Two
types of lexemes pose special problems due to their generic nature, namely weasel words
(words that are intentionally ambiguous and misleading) and hypernyms (words with a
broad general meaning that more specific words fall under).  The former allows for a
degree of imprecision due to their vague character, the latter to create classifications
thanks to the semantic hierarchy they imply. In both cases, they echo the normative
nature of the law which requires to establish prescriptive rules that will apply to a class
of  people or to specific  functions (hence the impersonality of  legal  language)  and to
provide  for  a  variety  of  situations.  These  lexemes  do  not  bear  any  particular  legal
meaning but  are  commonly  used in  legal  messages  and thus  pertain  to  the  broader
definition of legal lexis provided in the Introduction.
 
2.1. Hypernyms
21 A hypernym or superordinate may be defined as “a word with a general meaning that
includes the meanings of other particular words, for example ‘fruit’ is the hypernym or
superordinate of ‘apple’, ‘orange’, etc.” [Oxford Leaners Dictionaries, online edition], while
“apple”, “orange”, “pear”, etc. are called the “hyponyms” of “fruit”. On the face of it, the
main advantage of using hypernyms is to avoid drawing up a list of elements concerned
by a particular rule for instance, as lists are necessarily incomplete – and are generally
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“hedged” by a word of caution such as “including, without limitation” or “including, but
not limited to” in legal texts. As with the example “fruit”, many hypernyms are borrowed
from everyday English and are not recorded in legal dictionaries (except where they
appear in terms such as “fruits of a crime”). It must be noted though that “fruit” features
in its Latin form, fructus, in Black’s Law Dictionary with a definition that partly matches its
plain English definition: “produce; profit or increase; the organic production of a thing”
[1998: 462]. The online version of this dictionary offers a definition that is quite close to
its plain English definition: “The produce of a tree or plant which contains the seed or is
used for food”17.
22 Resorting  to  hypernyms  offers  a  threefold  advantage:  meeting  the  law’s  need  for
genericity;  avoiding the  risk  of  omitting  an element  from a  list;  and decreasing the
complexity of a message by shortening it. Nevertheless, interpretation is not always eased
by hypernyms as the semantic relationship between a hypernym and its hyponyms may
vary,  as  pointed  out  by  Rosch’s  prototype  theory  [1973].  Pursuant  to  this  psycho-
linguistic theory, an orange or an apple are more prototypical of “fruit” than a tomato,
for instance. This may also be applied to the law, as any hypernym is likely to raise such
interpretation issues18. A leading case in this context is Nix v. Heddon (1893). Under the
1883 Tariff Act, a 10% tax was to be imposed on vegetables imported into the United
States. Edward L. Hedden, who was then collector of the Port of New York, had imposed
duties on tomatoes imported by the plaintiffs in 1886, based on Chapter 121 of the Tariff
Act. The plaintiffs claimed that botanically, tomatoes are fruit, not vegetables, and should
thus be exempted from the tax.  However,  US Supreme Court Judge,  Mr. Justice Gray,
found that as there was no evidence that the words “fruit” and “vegetables” had acquired
any special meaning in trade (i.e. the law could not attach any special meaning to either),
they must receive their ordinary (prototypical) meaning and accordingly tomatoes must
be considered as vegetables. Judgment was therefore held in favour of the defendant. In
another case, in Twining v. Mayers (1982), the question was to determine whether roller-
skates were to be considered as being hyponyms for “vehicle” in the following regulation:
“It shall be a criminal offence for any vehicle to enter the park”. Interestingly enough,
even though the noun “vehicle” does not feature in all legal dictionaries, the adjective
“vehicular” does under the entry “vehicular crime” in which it implies the use of a motor
vehicle (Blacks’ Law Dictionary, [1998: 1078]). The online version of this dictionary offers
the following definition for “vehicle”, thus broadening its scope: “The word “vehicle”
includes every description of carriage or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of
being used,  as  a  means of  transportation”19.  To sum up on this  point,  as  mentioned
earlier, hypernyms do not usually feature in legal dictionaries (unless they are part of a




23 Weasel words are resorted to for similar reasons: they meet the law’s need for a certain
degree  of  vagueness  and so,  unsurprisingly,  generate  interpretation problems.  These
lexemes are useful  in that they carry the degree of indeterminacy that is  sometimes
required in law.  Another common point they share with hypernyms is  that they are
copied from general English and do not always feature in legal dictionaries (which tends
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to indicate that their definition is that of plain English), except when they refer to a legal
concept.
24 Two weasel word adjectives are most often resorted to in law, namely “reasonable” and
“appropriate”. Whenever they are used, detailed contextualisation will be essential to
help determine their meaning, especially since their definitions are somewhat fuzzy and
vary according to contexts, as demonstrated by the definition of “reasonable” provided
by Black’s  Law Dictionary [1998: 874]:  “Fair,  proper,  just,  moderate,  suitable  under  the
circumstances”.  These  two  adjectives  are  heavily  used  in  legal  documents,  notably
contracts,  which  have  normative  thus  prescriptive  value  (“as  may  be  appropriate”,
“appropriate  use”,  “appropriate  remedy”,  “as  deemed appropriate”,  “if  appropriate”,
“reasonable  time”,  “reasonable  notice”,  “reasonable  doubt”,  “reasonable  force”,
“reasonable compensation”, “reasonable care”, etc.). As a matter of fact, the adjective
“reasonable” is used in terms that refer to key concepts at Common Law. In the 1998
version of Black’s Law Dictionary, it is used in nineteen entries, most of which offer circular
definitions  as  they  are  based  upon  the  adjective  “reasonable”  itself  or  the  adverb
“reasonably”. Initially, the idea of “reasonableness” refers to someone having the faculty
of  reason.  In  tort  law  for  instance,  the  duty  of  care  is  measured  against  that  of  a
“reasonable person” (of the same trade, gender, age, etc. depending on the circumstances
of the case)20. It follows that what is deemed “reasonable” is relative. This vague notion is
therefore crucial in law as it precisely needs to adapt to all sorts of circumstances. 
25 Consequently, and contrary to common belief, “source-oriented lexis”, in particular the
lexis copied from general English, is not necessarily any easier to interpret. In England
and Wales, three principal rules are generally used to help interpret legal documents:
“the plain meaning rule or literal rule” (as its name indicates, the judges will stick to the
literal meaning of the words), “the Golden rule or British rule” (it allows to depart from
literal interpretation if the latter leads to an absurd result),  and finally “the mischief
rule” (it consists in endeavouring to find the spirit of the law if the letter of the law fails
to produce acceptable results). It is not uninteresting to note that these rules are resorted
to in order to clarify the meaning of words borrowed from plain English. For instance, the
law holds that usurping a person’s identity is a crime. In Whitely v. Chappel [1868] LR 4 QB
147, it was held that as a “person” needs to be alive to exercise their right to vote, the
defendant had not committed any crime when he usurped a dead person’s identity for
purposes of  voting.  Similarly,  the Street  Offences  Act  1959 states that “[I]t  shall  be an
offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the
purpose of prostitution”21.  In Smith v. Hughes (1960) 2 All  E.R.  859,  Lord Parker found
against prostitutes who were calling passers-by from their balconies (and who were not,
consequently, “in a street or a public place”)22, arguing that everybody knew “this was an
Act to clean up the streets”23. The courts will therefore strive to determine the meaning
of plain English words by establishing the context in which they are used. In addition, in
cases where lexemes are part of a list, judges may decide to apply the “ejusdem generis
principle” (“of the same kind”). For instance, in Powell v. Kempton Park Racecourse (1899),
the noun phrase “other place” was interpreted as meaning “other indoor place” as it was
ending a list composed exclusively of such places (“house, office, room or other place”).
26 However, such rules may prove of little use in cases where the lexemes are complex to
understand per se. It is often the case with certain adverbs composed from the deictics
“here” and “there” (“hereinafter”, “thereof”, etc.) which, as mentioned earlier, feature in
legal dictionaries because they are used quite extensively in legal documents even though
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they do not carry any legal meaning whatsoever. The complexity of their interpretation
lies  in  the  fact  that,  firstly,  they  date  back  to  thirteen  centuries  ago  and  are
understandably considered archaic today; and secondly, they do not point to something
that  is  always easy to identify  in the context  of  the document (apart  from common
utterances  such as  “the parties  hereto”  or  “the schedules  hereof”).  The archaism of
certain lexemes is, in fact, often criticised as a barrier to understanding (much has been
written on the use of the modal shall for that matter, mostly to suggest legal documents
should be rid of it). The language of the law is known for keeping its loanwords over the
centuries24,  and as such, antiquated lexemes are still  very much part of legal English,
including those that have no legal meaning but are nevertheless considered as “legal”
because they are commonly used in legal documents and/or feature in legal dictionaries.
 
Conclusion
27 Three general conclusions may be drawn from the above discussion on how specialised
legal lexis is.
28 Firstly, legal lexis is used by law, but not exclusively, and may have legal meaning, but not
necessarily. Consequently, the lexical units belonging to the narrow definition of legal
lexis,  that  is  to  say  those  carrying  at  least  one  legal  meaning,  are  only  partly
characteristic of legal lexis. Furthermore, the mere fact of featuring in a legal dictionary
is not sufficient to determine whether a lexeme is “legal” (as far as meaning is concerned)
since some lexemes featuring in such dictionaries do not carry any legal meaning at all.
Conversely, some lexemes are consistently used in legal discourse though they do not
appear in legal dictionaries (this is the case of most weasel words for instance). It cannot
be said either that legal lexis is used in legal messages/contexts only as it can be used in
non-legal acts of communication by professionals and lay people alike – although in the
latter case it may be argued that it is used in a semi-technical way, proving that such lexis
is semantically flexible.
29 Secondly,  legal  lexis  is  essentially  polysemous  due  to  the  borrowing  processes  that
characterise it. Lexical borrowing, which is “one of the ways of language enrichment,
does not lead to the loss of its specificity and identity” (Tarev [2012: 945]). However, it
does add to its complexity. When considering the broader definition of legal lexis, we see
that legal lexis is composed of lexical units typically used in legal discourse in order to
express its needs, in particular the need to be generic in order to provide for the largest
number of situations – hence the use of weasel words, hypernyms and vague notions such
as that of “reasonableness”.
30 Thirdly, context is paramount in determining the legal interpretation of a lexical unit. It
has to be established whether the context is legal or not and, if it is, the branch of the law
that is concerned (is the context contractual, legislative or judiciary?) has to be identified
since a single unit may have different meanings depending on the legal branch it is used
in – not to mention the Common Law family it belongs to.
31 Therefore, the answer to the question asked at the beginning of this paper (i.e.  what
makes  legal  lexis  legal?)  concerns  legal  usage  rather  than  legal  meaning.  As  a
consequence, if it is accepted that legal language resorts to all the means that contribute
to expressing the communicative needs of the law, legal lexis is a characteristic of legal
language in its broader definition in so far as it meets its communicative requirements. In
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this respect, an interesting line of enquiry would be to determine to what extent the
characteristics  of  legal  lexis  (borrowings  from other  languages  and domains,  source-
oriented  and  recipient-oriented  lexis,  polysemy)  are  shared  by  other  specialised
languages  in  an attempt to  conduct  a  comparative analysis  of  the use of  specialised
lexicons.
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NOTES
1. The adjective “generic” is used in the sense that the law is general to a group (over a given
territory) as opposed to applying to specifically identified individuals (Courbe [2007: 3-4]).
2. These documents, needed to start any legal action, were in use for about one thousand years in
England and contributed to creating a centralised judiciary system and thus to enforcing a single
system of law over the territory (Lupoi [2000: 303]).
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3. The  tree  metaphor  is  often  used  to  describe  the  spreading  of  the  different  common  law
systems,  the  trunk  representing  the  original  English  Common  Law  from  which  the  other
Common Law systems branched out (Richard [2014: 108-109]).
4. The  generic  term  “Danes”  referred  to  all  the  Scandinavian  populations  that  settled  in
Northern and Eastern England towards the end of the 7th century (Innes [2000: 78]). The term
“Dane  Law”  (Dana  Lagu)  is  used  in  the  Anglo-Saxon  Chronicle (annals  written  in  old  English
recounting  the  history  of  the  Anglo-Saxons)  to  refer  to  both  the  territory  where  these
populations settled and the system of law they lived under.
5. This phenomenon, known as the “personality of law”, comes from the Romans and expanded
in Europe during the Middle Ages (Rouland [1988: 336]).  It  concerns laws which regulate the
condition of persons as opposed to those which regulate property and things.
6. Another reason that often accounts for foreign borrowings is prestige (Townend [2002: 203]).
This is especially true of Latin (Beveridge [2002: 5]),  as exemplified by Poland’s new Supreme
Court building in Warsaw which is decorated with maxims in Latin (Mattila [2005: 74]).
7. In  reality,  Common Law really  developed  during  the  reign  of  Henry  II  who is  commonly
considered  as  “the  founder”  of  the  Common  Law  as  he  established  many  of  its  founding
principles.
8. Previous attempts were made, such as the Statute of  Pleading passed by Parliament in 1362
imposing English in all courts of law so that the proceedings would be conducted in a language
supposedly easier to understand for lay people.
9. These two categorisations are inspired by Ladmiral’s [1986] binary theory of source language
oriented and target language oriented translation strategies.
10. “Mortgage”, from the French “gage mort”, literally means that the debt is “dead”.
11. In  the  same  way,  a  “prayer”  is  defined  as  “a  request  addressed  to  the  court”  (Garner
[1987: 426]). For instance, “age prayer” is a “suggestion of nonage, made by an infant party to a
real  action,  with a prayer that  the proceedings may be deferred until  his  full  age.  It  is  now
abolished.”. See http://thelawdictionary.org/age-prayer/
12. West  [2005: 435-443]  presents  a  large number of  such differences  between American and
British legal languages.
13. Avoir tort means “to be wrong” in French while “a tort” is a civil wrong outside contract law.
Though these meanings seem close on the face of it, the legal meaning is not transparent at all to
a French-speaking person unfamiliar with the Common Law, especially since some negligence
torts, one of the three types of tort, are viewed as no-fault liability torts (vicarious liability torts).
14. In such cases, the legal meaning is usually watered down (Resche [2001: 40]) or simplified in
order  to  be  operative  in  non-legal  contexts  and  meet  the  requirements  of  non-legal
communication. The lexemes are no longer “terms” but mere “words” and defined in a way that
is accessible to lay people in general English dictionaries (sometimes with mistakes, from a legal
point  of  view).  Such  lexis  is  sometimes  called  “sub-technical”  or  “semi-technical”  by  some
authors (Baker, Cowan, Flowerdew, Trimble, etc.) if one adopts the lay users' point of view, but
could  also  be  called  “flexible”  due  to  their  capacity  to  undergo  semantic  and  conceptual
simplification. 
15. This definition assumes that the reader makes the difference between criminal law and civil
law.
16. In  this  sense,  para-legal  lexis  may  be  construed  as  borrowed  from  legal  lexis  for
communication purposes.
17. http://thelawdictionary.org/fruit/ 
18. For instance, if  a law concerns “birds”, does it  include ostriches though they cannot fly?
(Crystal [1995: 374]).
19. http://thelawdictionary.org/vehicle/ 
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20. The key notion “beyond reasonable doubt” in criminal law, which implies that jurors should
not harbour the least doubt as to the defendant’s guilt to convict them, often requires to be
explained, as lay people often think that they may have some doubt, as long as it is “reasonable”.
In this respect, a study conducted in New Zealand in 1999 showed that the majority of those
surveyed understood the phrase in terms of percentages which varied between 50% and 100%!




24. As Bracton wrote in On the Laws and Customs of England (circ. 1235): “Lose a syllable, lose the
cause”, exemplifying how crucial it is to stick to the way things are worded in a legal system
based on precedents: “[a] slight change in words meant that the action would fail (Beveridge
[2002: 1], about the “prescribed form of writs”).
ABSTRACTS
It is common knowledge that specialised languages use some aspects of “languages” to express
the communicative objectives of specialised communities. Compiling and analysing specialised
corpora is one way of identifying recurrent features that tend to shed light on these special uses.
As  a  result,  it  is  possible  to  draw  a  list  of  the  linguistic characteristics  specific  to  a  given
specialised language, such as the use of a special lexicon or special lexico-grammatical features.
Some  of  these  features  are  so  specific  compared  to  other  varieties  of  languages,  whether
specialised or not, that they will naturally be identified as typical of, say, legal English, economic
English and so on. Therefore, lexis – and, to some extent, grammar – appears to be distinct from
one specialised language to another, or from non-specialised languages to specialised languages,
which would tend to show that specialised lexicons, together with some grammatical features,
are a defining feature of specialised languages. Yet, as we will show, much of legal lexis is shared
by other types of language, in particular everyday, non-specialised language, which implies that
legal lexis is necessarily polysemous. Therefore the question is:  how legal/specialised is legal
lexis?  Or,  put  differently:  what  makes  legal  lexis  legal?  Can  legal  lexis  be  considered  as a
characteristic  of  legal  language? This  article  will  first  focus on some of  the borrowings that
characterise legal lexis in English and then look at some of the interpretation difficulties posed
by a number of lexical units that do not stand out as being “legal” but yet consistently appear in
legal messages and feature, for some of them, in legal dictionaries.
Les langues spécialisées, comme on le sait, utilisent certains traits des langues naturelles afin de
répondre aux besoins communicationnels des communautés spécialisées. Une façon d’identifier
les caractéristiques récurrentes qui,  a priori,  reflètent ces utilisations particulières,  consiste à
compiler et  analyser des corpus.  Il  est  ainsi  possible d’entreprendre de dresser une liste des
caractéristiques linguistiques propres à une langue spécialisée donnée, comme l’utilisation d’un
lexique  particulier  ou  bien  de  traits  lexico-grammaticaux  spécifiques.  Certaines  de  ces
caractéristiques sont si  singulières par rapport à d’autres variétés de langues,  qu’elles soient
spécialisées  ou  non,  qu’on  les  identifiera  comme  étant  typiques,  par  exemple,  de  l’anglais
juridique, de l’anglais économique, etc. C’est pourquoi le lexique et, dans une certaine mesure, la
grammaire,  semblent  distincts  d’une  langue  spécialisée  à  l’autre,  ou  bien  des  langues  non
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spécialisées aux langues spécialisées. On pourrait en conclure, dès lors, que lexique et grammaire
font partie de ce qui définit le spécialisé d’une langue. Pourtant, comme nous le montrerons, la
langue  juridique  partage  une  partie  conséquente  de  son  lexique  avec  d’autres  langues,
notamment  la  langue  générale.  Il  en  ressort  que  le  lexique  juridique  est  en  grande  partie
polysémique.  Dans  quelle  mesure,  par  conséquent,  le  lexique  juridique  est-il  « juridique » ?
Autrement dit, quels sont les éléments qui permettent de le qualifier ainsi ? Peut-on considérer le
lexique juridique comme une caractéristique de la langue juridique ? Nous nous proposons de
décrire et d’expliquer certains des emprunts lexicaux propres à l’anglais juridique, puis de nous
pencher  sur  les  difficultés  d’interprétation  que  posent  certaines  lexies  qui  ne  semblent  pas
spécialement « juridiques » mais qui, pourtant, sont utilisées régulièrement dans les documents
juridiques et figurent, pour certaines, dans les dictionnaires juridiques.
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